

FEB 1952 01-444

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REFORMATION REPORT
REFERENCE COPY

REPORT NO.

CD NO.

25X1
25X1

DO NOT CIRCULATE

COUNTRY China/Korea

DATE DISTR. 1 February 1953

SUBJECT Opinion on Communist Objection to Non-forcible
Repatriation of Korean War Prisoners

NO. OF PAGES 1

DATE OF

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

25X1 INFO.

25X1 PLACE

ACQUIRED

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. The fundamental reason for the persistent rejection by the Chinese Communists and Soviets of the principle of non-forcible repatriation of Korean war prisoners lies in the threat to the military might of the whole Communist bloc. Communist troops have continued to fight in Korea and Indochina because they anticipate only victory or death in retreat, but if these troops should discover an escape through voluntary surrender such as that provided by non-forcible repatriation, they would prefer surrendering to UN forces. Such repatriation would destroy the morale of the vast military organizations in all Communist countries.
2. If the Chinese gave encouragement at all to the Indian proposal, it was to allow India to crystallize the issue in the UN so that hope for a truce settlement with the American idea of repatriation could then be destroyed.
3. For strategic reasons CHOU En-lai or Vyshinsky could not mention this fundamental apprehension although it was common knowledge among government and party circles in China. Most Chinese leaders believe that American insistence on non-forcible repatriation was planned by the strategists in the State Department in order to deal a death blow to Communist military power.
4. The Chinese are convinced that the UN will finally accept the Communist demand to exchange prisoners according to international law, rather than send additional men and supplies to intensify the fighting in Korea. They expect the Republican administration to allow only intensified bombing operations in Korea. The Chinese rule out the possibility of extended bombing and blockade operations in China, for that would surely induce the USSR's participation in the war. If more Korean and Taiwan troops are brought into the fight, China can counter with an equal number of trained men.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB															
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI															